

KAULZA DE ARRIAGA

Av. João XXI, Nº9-6º

LISBON

PORTUGAL

Lisbon, July 9, 1975

General
Vernon Walters
Central Intelligence Agency
McLean, Virginia 22101
U.S.A.

Dear Sir,

1. I am not certain I am addressing former Captain Walters, who frequently travelled with President Eisenhower and was one of the greatest polyglots I have known.

If so, it is possible you may recall that I was also a captain at that time and a member of the Portuguese delegation to many NATO meetings.

In any event, it is now General Kaulza de Arriaga, Commander-in-Chief of Portuguese Armed Forces in Mozambique, from 1970 through 1973, who is addressing General Vernon Walters on the following matter.

2. Prof. Kenneth Maxwell, of Princeton University, in an article published by "The New York Review of Books", on May 29, 1975, states that you visited Portugal in the summer of 1974 and met with several people, among whom myself. The statements made by Prof. Maxwell insinuate that such encounters were conspiratorial in nature, and in fact preparatory to C.I.A. intervention in Portugal. Such statements and insinuations have been partially quoted by "Diário de Lisboa", a Lisbon evening paper under communist control, where Prof. Maxwell is said to be an exceptionally authoritative commentator by virtue of his membership in the Princeton Institute of Advanced Studies.
3. I do not know if you were or not in Portugal in summer 1974, but it is a matter of fact that we did not meet or have any other kind of contact, although this would have been perfectly proper if it had happened.

As it did happen, however, we never met on this or any other occasion, with the possible exception of the period when we were both captains, as already mentioned. And even then, we never discussed any aspect of Portuguese politics.

4. Quite apart from the consideration and esteem in which I hold you, it would be very valuable to me to be able to restore the truth, as urgently as possibly. So I will be very grateful if you'll be so kind as to write me a letter that I may cause to be published in Portugal confirming that you had no meeting or contact with me in summer 1974 or at any other time except possibly at the time we were both captains attending NATO meetings, and that we never exchanged views or discussed any aspect of Portuguese politics.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'K. de A. Arriaga', with a long horizontal line drawn underneath it.

Kaulza de Arriaga
General

and less militant groups within it and between some of the ruling officers themselves and the left politicians—

conflicts. I will discuss in a second article. The promised elections will still be held, and if the center parties are

able to campaign and get wide support another dangerous crisis will occur. Most of the scapegoats for Portugal's

old misfortunes have gone now—some of them to jail—and the real shape of power has yet to be determined. □

(This is the first of two articles on Portugal.)

The Hidden Revolution in Portugal

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Marcello Caetano, the deposed former prime minister of Portugal, and the exiled stalwarts of the old regime gathered recently in Rio de Janeiro with some satisfaction. Their nemesis António de Spínola was being shuttled from Spain to Brazil to Argentina to Brazil again, while his modest home in Lisbon was ransacked and his famous book, *Portugal and the Future*, burned by a vengeful mob. The events of a single year had in their view justified fifty. The Portuguese people had once more demonstrated their incapacity for self-rule, their need for firm authoritarian direction. The shrill falsetto of the old master Salazar echoed in their ears as ever, vindicated by history as he always believed he would be.

In Lisbon the jails held more political prisoners than before the April revolution. The Portuguese Communist party


little discussed, despite the fact that it was soon promulgated into the transitional constitution of the Portuguese Republic. This was a serious misjudgment. The curious truth was that in a land of much rhetoric and little content a document had appeared that meant exactly what it said. And in particular what it said about a policy in favor of "the least advantaged sectors of the population" and "the defense of the interests of the working classes."

Moreover, the MFA's ambiguous phrases about colonial policy and the "need for a political not military solution" were if anything a gross understatement. The MFA program and Spínola's book were in fact the two key documents of the Portuguese revolution and they set out positions so diametrically opposed that they

did not know," a device that allowed him to state quite seriously on April 25 that "he was not one of those who take up arms against their government." Thus the deceptive and contrived appearance of continuity when he arrived dramatically at the Carmo barracks of the Republican Guard (GNR) to "receive" from Caetano the transfer of authority. This was a maneuver to prevent, in Caetano's words, "power falling into the streets." It also served to keep the young captains and majors who had executed the coup from openly taking power at first.

But Caetano's fears came true. The popular response to the coup was far beyond the plotters' expectations. Loyalist units found themselves greeted as if they were insurgents; crowds milled around the armored vehicles

Portugal's admission into the EEC. It was a view close to important sectors of Portuguese capital, in particular such industrial magnates as António Champalimaud, Jorge de Melo, Miguel Quiná, and Manuel Espírito Santo. But the MFA program insisted that "the new economic policy... will necessarily imply an antimonomopolistic strategy." And each of these gentlemen headed empires that were monopolies—monopolies moreover in which was concentrated a large proportion of the wealth of Portugal under the control of a very small number of family combines. Known to the European international bankers who dealt with them as "Paleo-Capitalists," the gentlemen in control were far from being the very models of the modern manager they portrayed themselves as being. Nonetheless it was precisely these mag-



held the center of the stage with its discipline, its dour puritanism, and its dogmatic self-righteousness, the mirror image of Caetano's fallen dictatorship. Each day the political, strategic, and ideological stakes increase, and Portugal moves closer to social revolution and civil war. While next door the Franco regime totters toward collapse, the Italian and French left watches events in Portugal intently. And the fragile settlement in Angola too depends on what happens in Lisbon. Before the US government, NATO, and *The New York Times* talk themselves into a Dominican-type intervention in Lisbon it is worth examining in some detail what happened to the "Revolution of Flowers."

I

When the Caetano regime collapsed on April 25 last year there was much bewilderment, and the world press turned for explanations to the unlikely but familiar figure of General Spínola, whose book, it was thought, both explained and had incited the revolution. Scant attention was paid to the "Armed Forces Movement," the phrase itself often taken as if it were a descriptive epithet rather than the specific title of the compact group of revolutionary officers who had made the coup. While correspondents waded patiently through the baroque syntax of Spínola's *Portugal and the Future*, the movement's own "program" was

contained seeds for a conflict that could only be resolved by the victory of one over the other. The nature of the revolution disguised for a time the seriousness of the divergences within the new regime, and in particular disguised the degree to which the young officers who had made the coup were intensely political men. But the conflict staked out at the beginning reflected the entire Portuguese situation, which was at its heart a conflict between revolutionary and evolutionary change in Europe and between immediate decolonization and gradual disengagement in Africa.

The failure to see the importance of the MFA was caused in part by the ambiguity of the transfer of power which was itself a result of Spínola's crafty political footwork. The general knew perfectly well what was happening. Four and a half months before the revolution of April 25 he knew that the MFA had been formed and that it had decided, on December 1, 1973, to overthrow the regime. He was shown the MFA program after its approval by a secret assembly in Cascais on March 5, 1974, and he made important modifications in its language. He was briefed in detail on operations the evening before the coup by Major Otelo de Carvalho, the head of the military committee of the MFA.

Spínola's "legalist" position, however, was such that he both knew and

with little sense of danger. This bloodless revolution, however, resolved few contradictions.

Although Spínola could agree in principle to the Armed Forces Movement's program, the interpretation of that program was another matter. The MFA wanted much more than the shifting of a few ministers while the structures that had supported and sustained them for almost fifty years remained intact. Their program spoke of cleaning out (*sanear*) but where did *sanear* begin? More important, where did it end? Spínola had insisted that the MFA program describe neither the aim of the coup as "democratic" nor its enemy as "fascist"; and he deleted a paragraph on colonial policy which spoke of "the clear recognition of the people to self-determination." Major Vítor Alves, chairman of the committee of officers that drew up the document, regarded Spínola's federative scheme as "his personal dream." Yet during his first months in office Spínola spoke privately of a timetable for decolonization over "a generation or so," during which time the people "would be given democracy and equipped to choose."

The divergence over economic policy was equally fundamental. Spínola made plain his commitment to stepped-up industrialization and modernization of the economy.

nates who rushed to build the "New Portugal" and through their connections with Spínola believed they had in some way helped to create it. By which they meant they had not opposed it. Which was true.

Like Spínola they wished to see a rapid remodeling of the Portuguese economy on Western European lines, the elimination of inefficient and undercapitalized small and medium businesses, and the strengthening of larger enterprises which could sustain European competition. Well prepared for the new situation, they established their own front organization, the "Dynamizing Movement. Business Society," and brought out amid much publicity their own economic plan. Not surprisingly it called for large public investment in their favorite privately owned projects, the Lisnave and Setenave (Setubal) shipbuilding complexes, the Sines refining and petrochemical complex project, and tourism. The program they said would create 100,000 new jobs.

The major monopolies, however, stood at the center of the conflict between Spínola and the MFA. Because of the nature of their interests, national and international in scope, the problem of the economic system in Portugal and the nature of decolonization were inseparable. Of the various

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enterprises, built up around a near monopoly of the tobacco market, but long diversified into chemicals, shipbuilding, fertilizers, soap, textiles, mining, cellulose, refining, insurance, real estate, tourism, and restaurants. In addition to numerous joint ventures with foreign multinationals, CUF is linked through the Banco Totta Aliança into a vast spider's web of international interests, with connections to all the southern African giants, De Beers, Union Minière, and Standard and Chartered (15 percent owned by Chase Manhattan). CUF's stockholders equity last year was almost \$537 million, and its assets at least two and a half billion dollars.

Dr. Miguel Quinã, son-in-law and heir to the count of Covilhã, heads a group containing at least sixty companies. The Quinã empire has large interests in southern Africa, three banks (Borges e Irmão, Banco Crédito e Industrial, Banco do Alentejo), and interests in insurance, plastics, tires with General Tire and Rubber (Mabor), which in Angola has a ten-year monopoly, civil construction, textiles, fishing, oil in Angola, data processing, newspapers (*Diário Popular*, *Jornal do Comércio*), part ownership in *Primeiro do Janeiro*, marketing and advertising with J. Walter Thompson (Latina Thompson Associados).

The Espírito Santo group, whose chief administrator was Franco Nogueira, Salazar's former foreign minister, with twenty of its major companies directly administered by members of the Espírito Santo family, comprises the Banco Espírito Santo e Comercial, insurance (Tranquilidade), large agricultural holdings in Africa, pulp paper in Angola, petroleum in Angola in association with Belgium Petrofina (Petrangol), cellulose, tires (with Firestone), a near monopoly of beer in Portugal and similar interest in Angola, telecommunications, and tourism (ITT/Sheraton). Espírito Santo is associated with the First National City Bank of New York in Africa (Banco InterUnião). Champalimaud's empire contains banking (Banco Pinto e Sotto Mayor), a cement monopoly, the national steel monopoly, stock ranching in Angola, insurance, paper, and tourism.

The magnates, like General Spínola, regarded the retention of the African territories, even in the short run, as essential to their proposals for the development of Portugal. The economic relationship with Guinea was of little importance—the Cape Verde Islands lying off it are of more interest to NATO than to Portugal—but the stakes in Mozambique and Angola were very high indeed. With Portugal's own chronic trade deficits, and economic depression already affecting the remittances from Portuguese abroad and from tourism, the large surplus from the African territories would be painful to lose. In 1973 such earnings represented as much as 5 percent of GNP, about \$540 million. All the cotton of Mozambique was exported to Portugal and 99.7 percent of its sugar, both at well below world prices. At the same time the wages of Mozambique miners working in South Africa were converted into gold shipments to Lisbon—in effect a hidden subsidy to the Portuguese war effort since the bullion was valued at the official rate of \$47.20 an ounce instead of the inflated

nearly \$200. During the past three years the official value of this gold amounted to at least \$180 million.

The colonies also provided protected markets for Portuguese textiles, wines, and processed foods. The transfer of private funds and profits from the overseas territories showed a net worth of over \$100 million in favor of Portugal over the past two years. And there was the immense potential of the rapidly expanding and booming economy of Angola with its oil, iron ore, diamonds, coffee, fishing, and tropical cash crops.

But to retain Mozambique and Angola meant to continue the war the MFA had made the coup to end. The officers of the MFA, who had all fought in Africa, were totally opposed to a solution that merely changed the terms of the game. They did not believe Portugal as a whole benefited from retaining the African territories. Nor did they think, even in the improved international climate following the coup, that the Portuguese army could sustain the holding operation necessary if Spínola's model was to work. "We have no desire to construct a neocolonial community," one of

it is a malaise that remains, guaranteeing that the armed forces, and most especially the army, will be ready to defend the political, economic, or social settlement.

In a population of a little over eight million, one in four men of military age is in the armed forces. The army alone contained at least 170,000 men in 1974, of which 135,000 were in Africa. The air force had 16,000 men, the navy 18,000, the units of the Republican Guard (GNR) 10,000, and the paramilitary security police (PSP) 15,000. The armed forces represented (at a low estimate) a proportion per thousand of the population (30.83) exceeded only by Israel (40.09) and North and South Vietnam (31.66) (55.36); five times that of the UK, three times that of the US or Spain. The military budget represented 7 percent of GNP, more than that of the US. And that too was a percentage probably based on figures that were gross underestimations. With a per capita income of just over \$1,000, Portugal spent a minimum per capita of \$63.27 on military expenditure. Notwithstanding, the officers had abysmal salaries, while for the troops pay

"perturbed thunkies" of the Lisbon ministries was aggravated by class friction. In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, the academy opened its doors to cadets from rural and provincial backgrounds, many of humble origin. Sons of the aristocracy, *latifundiários*, and the urban upper middle class turned to other occupations. The change in patterns of recruitment of career officers accelerated after 1958 when the government decided to grant free tuition and a salary to cadets. By the mid-Seventies this produced a marked social cleavage within the professional officer corps (QP) between those below and those above the rank of lieutenant colonel. The fighting in Angola caused a rapid fall-off in the number of candidates for a professional military career, and by 1974 only one fifth of the places at the academy were filled. The result was a chronic shortage of manpower in the middle ranks and an almost complete absence of professional subalterns.

The officers who were conscripted from civilian life were another matter. After being drafted, men with secondary school or university training were automatically sent to special training programs at Mafra, a huge palace monastery some miles from Lisbon, constructed with Brazilian gold during the eighteenth century and intended to outsize and outdo the Escorial, which it spectacularly failed to do. From Mafra during the thirteen years of the wars in Africa emerged conscript sergeants and junior officers who soon dominated the company command level. Yet these men, though proven and popular, almost all military operations, remained consigned to a separate status from officers of the QP, and were referred to indiscriminately, whether sergeants or junior officers, as *milicianos*.

In an attempt to relieve the shortages in the professional ranks during the Sixties, some *miliciano* officers were allowed to enter the military academy and on graduation to join the QP. But those officers who followed this path became embittered when they found that their seniority within the QP started from the moment of graduation from the academy and their previous years of service were discounted. The government's decree of June 1973 (decree law 353/73) was intended to rectify this injustice. It provided for a speeded-up two semester course for *milicianos* at the academy (as opposed to four years for cadets), and permitted previous service to be counted toward seniority. The measure was to encompass, retroactively, former *milicianos* already within the QP.

Far from resolving any difficulties, the decree split the QP into warring factions. Former cadets felt their own training had been devalued. Others saw their promotion prospects wither as former *milicianos* by-passed them. The former *milicianos* reacted angrily to aspersions on their competence by former cadets. But these arguments over privilege and status had a curious effect. After June 1973 the issues discussed began to move far beyond purely professional grievances. Again the Caetano government inadvertently helped by choosing precisely that moment to encourage the most extreme opponents of any compromise in the colonies. A "Congress of Combatants" met in the crystal palace of Oporto in

early June to shout the Salazarist slogans of a "pluricontinental Portugal." But this meeting only demonstrated the total inability of the regime to see what soldiers on the ground knew perfectly well—that the colonial wars could not be won.

Four hundred combat officers petitioned the government in protest. Those who signed this petition in many cases were already on the committees of professional grievance. But while those committees had been ostensibly apolitical, the new protest group decidedly was not. And the protest brought men like Major Melo Antunes, who had at first refused to join, into the grievance committee that was soon to become the MFA. He had formerly believed it to be "a reactionary cooperative in defense of privilege."

The MFA at first was composed exclusively of captains and majors of the QP, a group of men numbering fewer than 200 out of the middle-rank corps of some 1,600. The MFA included some former *milicianos* but none of the younger men in their twenties who were still *milicianos*: MFA members were spread out in most units and they were especially strong in Guinea and Mozambique. After December 1, 1973, the organization was held together at the center by a fifteen-man coordinating committee, subdivided into a military committee charged with the detailed planning of an uprising and a political committee which formulated the program for the situation after the coup.

The coup itself was organized on a pattern borrowed from the Mozambique revolutionaries in the FRELIMO movement (one man would be in touch with four, each of whom was in touch with four more and so on), and embraced a much wider group than the membership of the MFA itself. The coordinating committee, which described itself as "a pure democracy... without chiefs," had serious misgivings about Spínola and reluctantly acquiesced in his designation as the leader. They preferred General Costa Gomes, who had also been discreetly kept abreast of the MFA's intentions. But the publication of Spínola's book in February, 1974, and the internal and international stiff it caused made his choice inevitable. And Spínola's participation was important in face of the lack of enthusiasm of the air force for the coup, especially if the support or at least the acquiescence of its 3,300-man paratrooper unit was to be assured. The same could be said for the 3,400-man force of Naval Fusiliers, and within the army itself for the elite cavalry units, especially Spínola's own Seventh Cavalry.

For a determined minority within the army the cry against "hierarchy" thus became a cover for more serious objectives. By the time the Caetano government realized its error, and withdrew its June 1973 measure, granting substantial pay increases in an attempt to mollify the officers, it was already too late. A dramatic convergence of resentments, loss of the sense of purpose, and emotional and intellectual estrangement produced a crisis of consciousness which held the seeds of a highly unusual military ideology. It was, and to some extent remains, almost unintelligible in the West be-

almost wholly African.

The very closeness and cohesion of the directing group had itself arisen from long war experience. Most of the members of the MFA had spent more time out of Portugal than in it; many had lived for thirteen years in combat conditions. The Portuguese army could not afford the luxury of rotations and lavish rest and recuperation periods. Each man would spend two years at the same post; twenty-four months in bush camps, some of them no more than stockades of tin cans deep in hostile territory. And in Africa there had been a double awakening as the officers initiated draft after draft of new conscripts from the Portuguese countryside. "What we saw was that Portugal was itself part of the third world. Lisbon and Oporto were an illusion, the country within was underdeveloped, with an illiterate and exploited peasantry."



them commented at the time. "We are interested more in the formation of a socialist interdependence, and that only to the extent that our brothers in Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola accept, desire, and demand."

II

The opinions of the MFA when they emerged in the months before and just after the coup were so surprising in military men, particularly those of a despised colonialist army, that they were rarely treated seriously. Spínola never fully gauged the political complexion of the MFA's coordinating committee, much less its political will, nor did left-wing politicians within Portugal, who at first dismissed the captains as "mercenaries of capitalism." This was perhaps inevitable. The movement had originated in response to professional grievances and concerns of status and privilege. None of this was any secret. The bungling attempts of the Caetano regime to increase the size of the professional officer corps (the QP, or *quadro permanente*) had been a raging issue within the army for at least nine months before the revolt.

The problem within the army was only in part that a coterie of captains was angry over promotions, pay, and lost esteem. Dissension within the officer corps was a reflection of a much deeper malaise, which grew from the very scale, composition, and organization of the Portuguese armed forces.

was token or nonexistent. It was an army with almost no fully professional units. Its private soldiers were and remain for the most part illiterate, badly trained, and at times tenuously disciplined.

The officer corps itself was composed of a group of aged generals; a segregated elite of staff officers exclusively devoted to administration and relieved of combat duty; and a diminished cohort of junior- and middle-rank officers (captains and majors), men in their thirties and early forties, who had spent most of their professional lives overseas. The generals were promoted by the council of ministers and chosen for political reliability; they shuttled themselves back and forth between lucrative positions on the boards of state and private enterprises. If they appeared at their desks at all, the staff officers rarely did so until late in the afternoon; only in the twilight months of the Caetano regime did a civilian minister of defense insist that work begin at nine in the morning. The defense ministry was little more than a coordinating agency, resented by the services, and the authority of the joint chiefs was never recognized by the navy. Corruption was so rampant that the war in Angola became known as "the war of the high-rises," after the fat kickbacks invested in the booming Lisbon real estate market.

The bitter antagonism of the junior officers in the field to the insensitivity, incompetence, and corruption of the

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BOOKS

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Peter Gay: STYLE IN HISTORY (Basic Books)
Richard Holmes: THE MAKING OF MODERN DRAMA: A Study of Buchner, Ibsen, Strindberg, Chekhov, Pirandello, Brecht, Beckett, Hare (Farrar, Straus & Giroux)
Elizabeth Harbeson: SEDITION AND BETRAYAL: Women and Literature (AFAP/Vintage)
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BIOGRAPHY

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John R. Sweeney: THE MAN AND THE MUSIC (U. North Carolina)
James A. Westberg, S.J.: FRANK THOMAS D'ADDIO: His Life, Thought and Work (Doubleday)

CHILDREN'S BOOKS

Natalie Babbitt: THE DEVIL'S STORYBOOK (Farrar, Straus & Giroux)
Bruce Buxton: THE LECTURE IN THE ZOO (Stevens/Vintage)
John Cheever: I TELL A LIE EVERY 50 WORDS (Farrar, Straus & Giroux)
James Lincoln Collier: MY FATHER'S SAM IS DEAD (Four Winds Press)
James Hamilton: M. C. HUGGINS, THE GREAT (Macmillan)
James & Elizabeth Lewis: JOE BANGALAI: THE CHILDREN OF BANGLADESH (Farrar, Straus & Giroux)
William Miller: REMEMBER THE DAYS: The Jews of Eastern Europe (Farrar, Straus & Giroux)
William Miller: WORLD OF OUR FATHERS: A Short History of the Jewish American (Doubleday)
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CONTEMPORARY

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FICTION

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At the same time the encounter with the liberation movements was equally instructive. "We were at war," one officer said, "with people who speak the same language. We had little sense of racial difference, much less of culture. Badly supplied, badly equipped, very quickly we came to resemble the guerrillas. There was very little difference between a FRELIMO officer and ourselves." Long conversations with prisoners were, as another member of the MFA put it, "truly a political initiation." This too was not accidental. The long struggles in Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola produced several important theoreticians who argued that "self-rule" produced an illusory freedom if it took place within the same social and political structures.

The liberation movements that emerged in the Portuguese colonies

were among the few genuine ones in Africa. With the important exception of Holden Roberto's FNLA, the issue in Portuguese Africa, for PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, FRELIMO in Mozambique, and MPLA in Angola, was not predominantly nationalism. It was neo-colonialism. And the nature of the struggle transformed a theoretical conclusion into a necessity for successful guerrilla action.

Led by the late Amílcar Cabral and Aristides Pereira in particular, the PAIGC combined European revolutionary theory, Asian experience, and Cuban example to create a party self-consciously fitted to the special geographical social and economic conditions of Guinea-Bissau. The PAIGC called for emphasis on "the people," for "re-Africanization" of cultural life, and for social action and economic reconstruction taking place through constant discussion, example, and dem-

wanted to "modernize" the tribal culture but to do so within the history of the people. Agostinho Neto, the president of MPLA, spoke of "a dual revolution, against traditional structures which can no longer serve them and against colonial rule." In Cabral's view the "petty bourgeoisie" who had already achieved some education and modern skills—but had no real part in colonial power—had become "the revolutionary vanguard."

The practical Marxism of PAIGC, FRELIMO, and MPLA had a remarkable impact on the young "petty bourgeois" officers of the Portuguese army in Africa, for whom Amílcar Cabral's notion of a petty-bourgeois "revolutionary vanguard" had more than usual appeal. For some, in fact, the boundary between theory and practice had been passed long before. Major Otelo de Carvalho, thirty-eight, born in Mozambique, leader of the MFA's military committee, and one of the most powerful men in Portugal after the coup, was to re-encounter his close friend Jacinto Veloso, a Mozambique Goan and former Portuguese air force officer, as a member of the FRELIMO delegation at Lusaka.

The "political" solution for Africa that the MFA talked about thus signified much more than "a negotiated settlement." As the MFA bulletin put it with some bluntness: "Those who benefited from the war were the same financial groups that exploited the people in the metropolis and, comfortably installed in Lisbon and Oporto or Madrid, by means of a vengeful people to fight in Africa in defense of their immense profits."

But how usefully and successfully could the ideas and anger drawn from the fighting in Africa be applied to the politics of European Portugal? The MFA officers, who could agree on the futility of war in Africa and the justice of "liberation" there, would often find themselves divided among themselves and from their fellow officers and leftist civilian allies when they tried to create a new politics at home.

III

Over the euphoric summer and early autumn of 1974 the real conflict in Portugal was submerged. There was an illusion of action as a kaleidoscopic theater of politics sprang up after fifty years without political expression. Not only were relations with Russia re-established for the first time since 1917, but the ideological experience of the twentieth century became crammed into nine months. On the best-seller lists one found Lenin's *April Theses* along with the poems of Agostinho Neto. There were marches and demonstrations where before a meeting of any political group would have been subject to brutal police attack. For glided youth with their neatly laundered blue jeans, tight light bottoms, and exaggerated crotches, it was a chance to spend hours stoned on whatever or whoever was available. Revolutionary homosexuals joined the anarchists. Revolution groups flocked to Lisbon while the going was good. Middle-class families parked their cars wherever they felt like it. Hustlers inundated the *Rio de Janeiro* displaying their wares by the Metro stop opposite the

"watches the world go by" ("What's Doing in Lisbon," *The New York Times*). Eventually even *Hair* arrived, with the "original English cast." It replaced an "International Sexy Festival" at the Teatro Monumental; a revue of naked German blonds in black leather jackboots, denounced by the Portuguese Communist party as "another CIA plot." At its worst Portugal after the coup was like an ancient boulder suddenly turned over to reveal a thousand bugs scurrying frenetically in the light, at its best a garden of fragile, brilliant, and tangled foliage, predominantly red.

The MFA program called for a long period in which a new political system was to be defined, and this made a season of interminable political rhetoric inevitable. Political parties had almost simultaneously to emerge, find their public, and face pre-electoral struggles. Constituent assembly elections were to take place within one year after April 25, 1974. In perhaps another year a parliament or president was to be elected under terms to be drawn up by the constituent assembly. The MFA took a courageous risk in

criticism and debate since the opposition groups regarded the electoral system itself as a fraud. The CDE was comprised of coalitions of "anti-fascist forces," mainly middle-class liberals, social democrats, Catholic radicals, independent Marxists, and the Communists (PCP). These grassroots alliances were extremely important in April and May of 1974. Their existence and activity created the false picture of a formidable communist phoenix rising out of nothingness. In fact many groups emerged from the cover of the CDE, and among them the PCP formed a small, if by far the best organized, minority.

The April revolution had thrown the high schools into chaos, and students spent the rest of the academic year purging the faculties of "fascists" and forming short-lived administrative committees of students, teachers, and maintenance personnel. Faced with the impossibility of holding examinations, the government rashly accepted, all high school students in their final year into the universities, creating in the fall of 1974 a freshman class of 28,000 which the universities, themselves in chaos, would have been totally incapable of absorbing even at the best of times. The government was then

would strengthen his own authority, "legitimize" that authority by popular acclaim, and through the political process circumvent the residual power of the MFA.


Spínola, moreover, started with formidable assets. He enjoyed vast popularity during months when the feeling of good will was palpable in Lisbon. It is true that he had to reckon with the "political committee" of the MFA. This group of seven officers, part of the coordinating committee that had drawn up the MFA program, moved en masse into the council of state, which under the transitional constitution was to assume power until the election of the assembly. (Among them was Lieutenant Colonel Vasco Gonçalves, now the prime minister, who was then regarded as one of the more "moderate" officers and has since emerged as an ally of the PCP. Paradoxically, some of the other officers, such as Major Vitor Alves and Major Melo Antunes, who were in April 1974 considered to be extreme radicals of the African army, have since become proponents of pluralism and constitutionalism.)

But Spínola could feel that the seven MFA officers were more than balanced on the council by the heavily conservative "Junta of national salvation"—seven senior officers representing all the various armed services—and by his own seven appointees to the council. The latter included colonels from his personal entourage and several bigwigs of the old regime, such as Dr. Azeredo Perdigão, president of the Gulbenkian Foundation. Spínola appointed another loyalist, Colonel Miguel, as defense minister, and put a leading rightist general in command of the critical Lisbon garrison. He sent to Angola as governor one of the main proponents of "integrating" the colonies with Portugal, General Silveiro Marques, whose brother Jaime was a member of the junta.

The General meanwhile placed the full weight of his prestige behind a new centrist Popular Democratic Party (PPD) formed from the ranks of the reformers of the old regime and members of SEDES (Association for Economic and Special Development). This is an establishment group founded in 1970 that encompassed a wide spectrum of political tendencies dedicated to peaceful change and liberalization. Among the luminaries of SEDES were men who had made considerable reputations for themselves as liberals, such as Francisco Sá Carneiro and Magalhães Mota, both deputies in the National Assembly during the early Castaneto years when they sought to "reform from within."

Such a grouping could also count on the support of Francisco Balsemão. A brilliant thirty-eight-year-old lawyer, entrepreneur, and publicist, Balsemão was an influential liberal deputy (1969-1973) and the founder, director, and majority shareholder of the weekly *Expresso* (and before that an employee of the daily owned by the Quina group). Among the few truly competent and lively newspapers in Portugal, *Expresso* wields exceptional influence, not only within the country but outside Portugal as well, since many foreign correspondents take much of their copy from its pages.

How little these circles understood, the activities of the MFA were changed



insisting on this plan. But it provided no ground rules and for the new parties it meant a leap into a void.

The highly theoretical character of much of the debate after the coup was not accidental. The Salazar-Castaneto regime had in cultural and intellectual matters become perilously close to totalitarianism. By raising the stakes of loyalty and narrowing its definition, the old regime had made all intellectual activity political. Historical myths were part of the regime's ideological "essence." To deflate them brought instant retribution and eventually the men who fabricated the myths by acting out their fantasies were destroyed by them. It is a process laid bare with startling if unconscious clarity in Castaneto's apologetic, *Despoimento*, published in Brazil last fall. Nevertheless the singular heritage of Salazar was to give words the appearance of action and sometimes even the power to create events. Paradoxically, therefore, the country with the highest illiteracy rate in Western Europe (37 percent) has a large and avid public of book readers who are attuned to the smallest political nuance, something which helps to explain the impact of General Spínola's book last year and of the subsequent books by MFA officers which became best sellers.

Although no one under seventy had ever voted in anything resembling a free election before the coup, local political organizations, called "democratic election commissions" (CDE) existed throughout Portugal.

For those with an eye to power this was not necessarily disadvantageous. Spínola's political strategy was based on three assumptions: First that the left would trip over itself and break up. Second that the high visibility of the leftists would in time make them an ideal scapegoat. And third, that their lack of real support in the country

would show him to constitute a

OF THE BEST

OF THE YEAR

26TH ANNUAL NATIONAL BOOK AWARDS

- QUARRY AFFAIRS**
 1. *Quarry* by Robert Bly
 2. *Quarry* by Robert Bly
 3. *Quarry* by Robert Bly
 4. *Quarry* by Robert Bly
 5. *Quarry* by Robert Bly
 6. *Quarry* by Robert Bly
 7. *Quarry* by Robert Bly
 8. *Quarry* by Robert Bly
 9. *Quarry* by Robert Bly
 10. *Quarry* by Robert Bly
- PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION**
 1. *Philosophy and Religion* by Robert Bly
 2. *Philosophy and Religion* by Robert Bly
 3. *Philosophy and Religion* by Robert Bly
 4. *Philosophy and Religion* by Robert Bly
 5. *Philosophy and Religion* by Robert Bly
 6. *Philosophy and Religion* by Robert Bly
 7. *Philosophy and Religion* by Robert Bly
 8. *Philosophy and Religion* by Robert Bly
 9. *Philosophy and Religion* by Robert Bly
 10. *Philosophy and Religion* by Robert Bly
- POETRY**
 1. *Poetry* by Robert Bly
 2. *Poetry* by Robert Bly
 3. *Poetry* by Robert Bly
 4. *Poetry* by Robert Bly
 5. *Poetry* by Robert Bly
 6. *Poetry* by Robert Bly
 7. *Poetry* by Robert Bly
 8. *Poetry* by Robert Bly
 9. *Poetry* by Robert Bly
 10. *Poetry* by Robert Bly
- THE SCIENCES**
 1. *The Sciences* by Robert Bly
 2. *The Sciences* by Robert Bly
 3. *The Sciences* by Robert Bly
 4. *The Sciences* by Robert Bly
 5. *The Sciences* by Robert Bly
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 9. *The Sciences* by Robert Bly
 10. *The Sciences* by Robert Bly



The twenty-sixth annual National Book Awards have been administered under the auspices of a Selection Committee on the part of the American Book Company, Inc., and the American Book Company, Inc., is the publisher of the awards.

... Jorge Amado, the former minister of education under Caetano. Eventually he settled for Professor Palma Carlos, a liberal "apolitical" law professor. In fact five members of Spínola's provisional government had been former students of both Caetano and Palma Carlos—none of them with any sympathy or even understanding of the radical ideas implicit in the MFA program.

But the closeness of the politicians to one another and their intimate connections with figures of the old regime was scarcely surprising. It was a function of the smallness of the Portuguese elite. Even the carefully inspired mystery surrounding the private life of the communist leader Álvaro Cunhal has much to do with the fact that he married into the family of one of the most notorious interior ministers under Salazar and Caetano, Dr. António Rapazote. And Cunhal once taught in a private high school where he successfully encouraged one of his students, Afonso Soares, to join the Communist party. Soares now leads the Socialist party.

The new parties and "autonomous groups," especially those of the center and left, had a monotonous sameness in their social composition. But to know your neighbor is not necessarily to love him. The parties crystallized around what were often coteries of friends, ideological differences often originating in personal antagonisms. In theory little divided the positions of those who joined, shifted among, or dramatically bolted the PPD (which also called itself socialist, the PSP (Portuguese Socialist party), the MES (Movement of the Socialist Left), the MSP (Popular Socialist Movement), SEDES, or those who remained under the umbrella of the CDE, which after April became the Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP/CDE).

The central committee of the MDP/CDE is typical: 25 percent are lawyers, 15 percent university professors, 10 percent economists, 7.5 percent publicists, 7.5 percent engineers, 5 percent doctors, and 3 percent high school teachers. (It includes many Catholic radicals and allies itself with the PCP.) And as always the Portuguese left had half an eye over its shoulder for the latest French political parallel, the smallest Parisian dispute being much better known than the mysterious and somewhat disagreeable doings of Trás os Montes or Portalegre.

Mário Soares in many ways personified the problem. His lengthy memoir *Portugal Amordaçado* ("Portugal Silenced") is a catalogue of fluctuating friendships, acquaintances, minor tribulations, and brushes with the secret police (PIDE/DGS). His most spectacular dispute with Salazar was caused by his representation of the family of General Delgado in the still mysterious affair of his assassination. He was deposed to São Tomé. Soares had also represented members of the Melo family, and Jorge de Melo intervened to aid the deportee by proposing that Soares represent an important CUF subsidiary in the islands. Only Salazar's personal opposition prevented Soares from taking the job.

The Portuguese Socialist party (PSP) grew from the Portuguese Socialist Action founded in Geneva in 1964 and became a formal party at Bad Münst-

er, is a member of the socialist international. Soares is a strong "Europeanist" with close relations with the European social democrats, Willy Brandt, François Mitterrand, Roy Hainard, and Jim Callaghan in London to help. The European social democratic leaders also sent substantial funds to the PSP, trying to match the millions of dollars Communist parties in Eastern and Western Europe have sent to the PCP.

All these friends of Soares made a special point of stressing the importance of the Western alliance. But NATO is a very sore point to social democrats in Portugal. Salazar had entered the alliance in 1949 when liberals and democrats in Portugal had hopes of support from the Western nations. They regarded NATO's embrace of Salazar as a betrayal and a cruel one, for they had risked much in coming forward to demonstrate their aims and strength under Salazar. Whatever Soares might say abroad, the PSP finds it prudent to follow a more ambiguous neutralist policy at home. The growing chorus of "concern" about "the situation in Portugal" by NATO officials is greeted with increasing irritation by liberals and democrats in Lisbon. Where, the Portuguese wonder, were those long terrible years of repression?

But the politicians' knowledge of each other is equaled only by their ignorance of the army in general and the MFA in particular. If practically all the politicians, in all parties, are lawyers, intellectuals, or professionals, the leaders of the MFA are decidedly different. Although some of the soldiers are university men, they had, like Vasco Gonçalves and Melo Antunes, studied mathematics, often at the technical university in the gray northern city of Oporto. The politicians had little or no practical experience of Africa, the technocrats trained in North America and Western Europe even less. The politicians and the radical officers soon found they were speaking different languages. As early as last summer Major Vitor Alves, one of the most "intellectual" of the MFA's leaders, criticized the "abstract notions of Portugal" of those communists and socialists who had been exiles, as well as the corrosive effects of self-censorship on those that remained. And though they would only admit it at first in private, many leaders of the old "democratic opposition," especially the social democrats, were deeply distrustful of the army's intentions.

Not so the PCP. While most other politicians talked of an alliance between Spínola and their parties, Cunhal spoke of an alliance between the MFA and "the people" (MFA-Povo). But it was Spínola, in a move that surprised even the MFA at the time, who invited the PCP into the provisional government. He did so because he believed that "the communists prefer their partners to be martyrs rather than policemen." Foreseeing that the demands of the workers could not fail to be explosive after a winter of savage inflation and brutal police repression, he hoped by placing a communist in the ministry of labor and bringing Cunhal into the cabinet as a minister without portfolio that these demands would be moderated and restrained. And he also hoped that the Moscow-

with the Russians to encourage them to use their good offices with the liberation movements to aid a Spínola settlement in Africa. Cunhal in return was promised a few hundred million dollars to help the PCP on the extreme left.

All three calculations were wrong-headed. They offered what the PCP was only too willing to concede or promised what the PCP was unable to deliver. The PCP would have acted with "moderation" whatever its position in or outside the new government. It was determined to avoid creating a Chilean situation. Its long-standing tactics were to form alliances with parts of the urban and rural middle classes. In fact its most recent gains had been among lower-middle-class workers, especially the bank clerks, a leader of which was the new labor minister. Moreover the PCP had very little influence with the African liberation movements, which, while accepting Soviet aid, were by no means disposed to accept Soviet advice. The Portuguese communists had no inclination to get involved in decolonization at all, and washed their hands completely of the entire colonial issue from the beginning, assuming that independence would be achieved. They concentrated all their efforts where the long-range issues of the PCP's own future and that of Portugal would be settled: Within Portugal itself.

The PCP was only too pleased to get what help it could against "extremists." The party had emerged (1971) out of a working-class tradition that was strongly anarchist and anarcho-syndicalist, and was especially sensitive to attacks from the left. Bitter fighting over "Titoism" had split the party in the late forties before Cunhal consolidated his authority, and disputes erupted again during the 1960s. In the universities the PCP lost much of the almost monopolistic support it had enjoyed in earlier years; the new generation found its dogmatism unattractive, its passivity infuriating, and its slavish support for Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia despicable. A variety of Marxist-Leninist and Maoist factions grew. The Marxist-Leninists broke up after bitter feuds over purity. But the Maoists (from 1971) the formidable MRPP (Reorganizing Movement of the Party of the Proletariat). Several urban guerrilla groups also emerged.

In 1970, responding to the decline of the PCP's dominant position on the left, Cunhal laid out the Party's new strategy with a frankness he would not have permitted himself had he any idea he would shortly be a member of a Portuguese government. *O Radicalismo Pequeno Burguês de Fachada Socialista* (second edition, Edições Avante, 1971) was a violent attack on "pseudo-revolutionary verbalists" and "petty bourgeois radicals." It was also a stout defense of the Party's definition of the present "stage," that of a "democratic and national" revolution. "Democratic" in that it would espouse civil liberties and act in concert with social democrats and others against the monopolies and *latifundiários*, "national" in that it would pursue a neutralist, "anti-imperialist" foreign policy.

In practice, this program meant the PCP would try to consolidate two power bases. First in the Alentejo, the

Tagus; they would work among the anti-clerical, landless rural laborers of the great estates, people with a long history of communist militancy and subject to chronic seasonal unemployment well and on which he counts for votes in the coming elections. He is the author of one of the few detailed analyses of the social and economic structures of the Portuguese countryside, *A Questão Agrária em Portugal*, published in Brazil in 1968 (Civilização Brasileira, Rio de Janeiro, 1968).

Second, the Party would try to make alliances with, or at least assure credit and support for, the small and medium business men; so that if they were not friends they would at least not become enemies. For the PCP this alliance would be crucial—just how crucial was underlined by the fall of Allende after "small businessmen" turned violently against him. Small and medium-sized businesses comprise 98 percent of the total number of Portuguese enterprises, and they employ 52 percent of the total number of workers. Of course, as Cunhal explained in 1970, these allies would be eliminated at the next "stage." He would not object to a party-controlled state should that "stage" be attainable. (His *O Radicalismo Pequeno Burguês*, however, is for obvious reasons no easier to obtain in Lisbon since the April coup than it was before.)

After April 1974, therefore, the Portuguese communists placed themselves firmly in the center of the political spectrum. They resisted workers demands; ensured that the minimum wage was as low as possible, and they were sensitive—~~not over~~ to criticism (which was not slow in coming) from "pseudorevolutionary" leftists and "petty bourgeois radicals." Which itself was not very surprising in a party as heavily populated with petty bourgeois as the PCP. Cunhal was remarkably frank when he told the *Wall Street Journal* (February 20, 1975) that as a youth he "took to the streets of Lisbon selling neckties to get to know the workers."

But like most things in Portugal during those cyclone months, appearances were deceptive. The "centrist" position of the communists had a totally different content from that of Spínola and the PPD. The groups they supported and sought to encourage were diametrically opposed. If the small businesses were encouraged, there could be no "rationalization" of the economy along the lines proposed by Spínola's allies. As with the colonial issue, the hidden center of the antagonism between Spínola and the PCP was in the offices of the great monopolies. For if the communists plan to finance and gain support or at least tolerance from the small business class was to work, then they needed the banks' acquiescence; and the banks were of course the linchpin of the Melo, Champalimaud, and Espírito Santo empires.

It was a conflict not easily resolved without the victory of one position over the other, for they were wholly incompatible. Moreover, it was a conflict that pitted a view of the past not against that of the future but against two views of the future. For Spínola's view of a modernized country, developing the kind of large-scale corporate technology and trade that had made

per, was just as "revolutionary" for the Portuguese as that of the communists, perhaps more so.

As the opposition between Spínola and the communists sharpened, for everything that had happened since, it brought into closer collaboration the MFA officers and the PCP. Cunhal, who once denounced "petty bourgeois radicals" of any kind, now was firmly allied with some of the most successful petty bourgeois radicals to appear in Europe since World War II—the leaders of the MFA.

If at times the political maneuvering among Spínola, the MFA, and the communists seemed like comic opera, beneath the surface it was a struggle in earnest with very high stakes. For Spínola it was a path of constant retreat. In July he was forced to accept as prime minister the oldest member of the MFA's "political committee," Lieutenant Colonel (now Brigadier General) Vasco Gonçalves. Unknown to his fellow officers Gonçalves had been for many years one of the PCP's most prized "assets," a secret collaborator with the Party, whether or not he ever joined it. In September Spínola was forced to resign after he failed to bring off the mass demonstrations and the immediate presidential elections that he hoped would keep him in power. After he left office, most of his appointees and friends in the provisional government either became ceremonial figures or have been replaced by men congenial to the MFA and the left parties, while the position of the PPD and the SEDES group, on which he had gambled, has now become precarious. By the same time its appeal to the electorate may have increased.

We still do not know the full story behind the "attempted coup" in March that forced him to flee to Spain and then Brazil. As often happens in Portugal, the events, including a series of bizarre plots and whispered deceptions, remain obscure enough for all parties to give explanations that seem plausible yet serve their own interests. What the left claimed were *intentional*—because they won—for the right were *inventive*, because they lost. And they lost much, for this stunted *attentat* provided the occasion for the MFA both to purge the last of Spínola's men and to put into effect the key condition of the PCP's economic strategy—the nationalization of the banks.

No less important in bringing about Spínola's fall were the panicky reactions and badly informed interference by the Western powers. Spínola conceivably might still be in Portugal were it not for the US and Western European support of precisely those far-rightist groups whose prospects were always dim. And equally crucial to the eclipse of the Spínola group were the secret pressures of the MFA on the negotiations in Africa which in just over six months gave independence to Guinea-Bissau, brought FRELIMO into the government of Mozambique, and set up a timetable for solving the most intractable problem of all, the independence of Angola.

Now a new act is beginning, probably an even more turbulent one. If Spínola's flight brought the dominant power of the MFA into the open, hostilities will now be between the

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Portugal Under Pressure

Kenneth Maxwell

The struggle in Portugal during the past year has been over ends and means. No one doubted the necessity for action when the old regime fell but there was very little agreement over what that action should be. With the establishment of the supreme military revolutionary council in March 1975, the nationalization of the banks and basic industry, and the forthcoming expropriation of landed estates of over 500 hectares, the question of ends has been settled. Barring a successful counterrevolution, Portugal is clearly set on the road to becoming a socialist state.

The question that remains concerns the means by which this will come about. And how it is answered will determine the future shape of Portuguese politics and society. The Portuguese themselves have given their own unequivocal answer. On April 25, just one year to the day after the nearly bloodless revolution overthrew Europe's oldest dictatorship, they overwhelmingly rejected authoritarianism—both by those nostalgic for the past and by those impatient to impose their vision of the future.

But they also categorically voted for change, and they did so in one of the highest turnouts ever recorded in a national election. The Portuguese Socialist party, led by Mario Soares, took 38 percent of the vote; the centrist Popular Democrats 25 percent; and Alvaro Cunhal's Portuguese Communist party 12.5 percent. The PCP's sister party, the Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDPCD) received a mere 5 percent; the right-wing CDS only 2.5 percent.

It retrospice it is remarkable that the Portuguese people got the chance of a free ballot at all. For it was a first-year filled with alarms and excursions. Many feared "what the people might do when for the first time Portuguese history they were given the chance to vote freely. Spínola and the CDS in the Popular Democrats had first attempted to abort the process by attempting early presidential elections that would confirm the general in office and stave off the threat of a communist electoral victory. When this failed and it became clear that the communists would gain only a small percentage of the vote, Cunhal and the PCP voiced concern over the lack of "preparation" of the voters, their subjection to indoctrination, and their general inability to make a responsible choice.

Behind the scenes other forces were at work too. This was hardly surprising, for much was at stake. When the "old" regime fell in Europe and in Africa. For revolutions that began with euphoria cannot remain mere words and noisy celebration. There were winners there must be losers too. And there seems forever doomed to brilliant moments when suddenly, after decades of obscurity, it becomes a microcosm of the hopes, the terrors, the fears and object rarely coincide, though both have the power to precipitate events. The mystery lies mainly in the eye of the beholder. And more often than not it is the past that haunts the present.

I Portugal had been the perfect ally for the US. It was docile, dependent, and had nowhere else to go. The US embassy in Lisbon was a quiet pasture for ambitious right-wingers who had gotten out of hand, such as William Tapley Bennett, Jr., of Dominican Republic office, and Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr. of the

sources of information when the Castro regime was toppled. Within the State Department there had often been any real disagreement over Portugal. The only "irritant" in US-Portuguese relations was caused by the US government's own equivocation and double standards in its dealings with southern Africa. So obvious had Washington been to the political forces in Portugal, so unwilling to have even informal connections with the democratic groups opposing the dictatorship, that it knew none of them. The Pentagon knew something, especially about the

know why they are doing all this, and we don't even know who most of them are."

The CIA station in Lisbon was of low importance and was regarded as a "retirement post." Since the late 1950s, however, the CIA had worked closely with the Portuguese political police (PIDE DGS). Many Portuguese agents came to the US for four-month training courses. Allen Dulles found them "of high caliber, diligent and gracious visitors." As he wrote in a letter discovered after the April 1974 coup. Most of those sent to the US were from the bureau of investigation, responsible for interrogation and, in numerous documented cases, for the torture of political prisoners. The inevitable result of these arrangements was that within a dying system the CIA was linked to the one element least anxious for change, and, as it proved in the event, the last to know that the real threat to the regime existed within the army.

In Portugal PIDE/DGS formed a grotesque state within a state, locked in continuous struggle with real or phantom communists of the PCP. As always, it was a struggle of mutual advantage, the importance of PIDE and PIDE each reflected in the survival of the other. But when PIDE was dissolved last year following the April coup, the CIA lost its local "asset."

Contrary to the arguments of CIA's current defenders, the nature of the CIA connections in Portugal, far from adding to Washington's knowledge, helped to blind it. After the coup, a "committee" including former political prisoners was set up to root out the political police and its vast network of spies and informers (the scale of the network informed even PIDE's most stringent critics). For the documents discovered at the fortress prison of Cascais outside Lisbon revealed that perhaps as many as one in every four hundred Portuguese had at some time been paid for information by the secret police. The committee inevitably contained communist militants. The CIA connection and that of several other intelligence agencies was thus threatened with exposure.

Or so they thought. In fact the communists could be counted on for the utmost discretion. The PIDE archives were more useful for blackmail than for public exposure. And their contents were of as much concern to the communist leader Alvaro Cunhal as to anyone else, for the PCP had some very embarrassing skeletons of its own. It had no desire to be uncovered, not least that of the assassinated General Spínola. The PCP will probably find good use for the skills of the former PIDE agents in time. Major (now Brigadier General) Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, commander of the MPFA, will be a prominent figure in the new Portugal (Coup Means Modern Portugal, Lisbon, 1975), has already argued that the majority of the PIDE agents "were only state functionaries, fathers of families, earning a living for themselves and their like anyone else."

(COPCON is more familiarly known these days as "Comunizar a PIDE Com Oito Nomes" how to organize PIDE with another name.) Certainly PIDE's connections with Western intelligence were no surprise to the Portuguese communists. PIDE agents often boasted of the CIA connection to their prisoners, including on one occasion to Mario Soares, now leader of the Portuguese Socialist party. In fact Alvaro Cunhal, the PIDE agent who accompanied Soares to the plane that deported him to São Tomé, had, since the late 1950s, been on the CIA payroll. (He started at \$500 a month.)

Most of the work of the commission was handled by young militant officers in their twenties with no more love for the "social facade" of the PCP than for the CIA. And the commission contained members of other parties who saw no reason for discretion and were subject to no party discipline. Some information did leak despite the frantic effort to prevent it. Of General Gabeiro de Melo, the minister of the Junta of National Salvation, responsible for the "disarming" process, *Le Nouvel Observateur* published some highly damaging information on the role of French intelligence in Portugal and a photograph of the Dulles letter I have mentioned.

Later Bruno Cruz in *Jeune Afrique* (January 31, 1975) reported in detail on those responsible for the assassination of Amílcar Cabral, not to mention implicating some of Spínola's closest associates in Guinea but again revealing some highly incriminating activities of French and German intelligence. None of these disclosures, however, endangered the new regime. Exposed to those shadowy, dangerous forces on which Western governments relied, perhaps with more confidence than was deserved, for accurate information.

The combination of diplomatic ignorance, on the one hand, with the poisonous antagonism and apprehension of the intelligence "community" on the other was only compounded by General Spínola when, with a cynical domestic politics, he invited the communist leader Alvaro Cunhal into the first provisional government. Unlike the PCP, Spínola had not learned the lessons of Chile. He totally misjudged, probably did not even consider, the reactions of Henry Kissinger.

What has been overlooked, in the "sudden" collapse of Kissinger's policies in Asia and the Middle East, is that the narrowness of Washington's room for maneuver in Portugal is totally self-created. Kissinger's reaction to events in Lisbon duplicated his reaction to Salvador Allende, and Portugal's fears and reactions to the US are fundamentally influenced by the manner of Allende's death. The type of relationship that existed before April 1974 between the US and Portugal, and the growing estrangement since, are both logical consequences of the foreign policy of the Nixon years.

"Rene Backman, *Portugal: Les archives de l'espionnage*, Le Monde (Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 222.


which is probably why its meaning is so studiously avoided by the pundits who find time to go anywhere but Portugal. Which again is not accidental, for Kissinger has on numerous occasions personally cautioned against visiting Portugal, advice which a few, Senator Edward Kennedy for one, chose to ignore, but which many apparently followed. Still, it is a particular irony how soon the Chilean chickens have come home to roost, and where.

Kissinger wrote in *A World Restored* that "a system of collective security justifies universal interference as well as common defense." But even Metternich (especially Metternich) knew where "universal interference" mattered and where it did not. There is Henry A. Kissinger: *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822* (Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 222.

is already grumbling in Washington that NATO is not working as an Alliance Solidarity, designed to protect against domestic upheaval as well as foreign aggression. Chile was, as Kissinger himself is supposed to have observed, "a missile aimed at the heart of Antarctica." Portugal is quite another matter. And however much Portugal's new rulers think of themselves as part of the "third world," that is not how Portugal is perceived by Western Europe, the US, or, for that matter, by the Soviet Union.

It is always with special irritation that the practitioners of *Realpolitik* discover that the counters they push around turn out not to be counters at all but balloons that have a habit of exploding at the most inconvenient moments. The tragedy of US-Portuguese relations is that in the absence of information (or in its ignored presence, which is what happened when Ambassa-

As soon as it became known that communists would participate in the government in Lisbon Kissinger's actions were panicked, reflexive, automatic. Almost immediately NATO "recess" were no longer passed to the Portuguese. Stories were leaked about a "Mediterranean domino theory." The US base in the Azores became a "decisive" element in the defense of Israel (Drew Middleton, "Importance of US Munitions to Israel Assured," *The New York Times*, December 2, 1974). Even General George Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of "Jewish lobby" fame, claimed that had Portugal not agreed to the war



Cunhal blockade. In Portugal they were surrounded by an exceptionally congenial "expatriate" community. Encouraged among the minuscule groves of Estoril and Cascais or the almost blossoms of the Algarve (where the late Fulgencio Batista, would-be or former monarchs (Don Juan of Spain, Umberto of Italy), aristocratic British colonies, a handful of ex-Nazis, and Elliott Roosevelt with his stud farm and his real estate interests in Torralta.

They all seem to have enjoyed Portugal. Admiral Anderson bought a villa in the south. Like so many others, he was not without influence. William Tapley Bennett, Jr. became assistant US ambassador to the UN. Admiral Anderson was appointed chairman of the President's foreign intelligence advisory board. They were a sure source of "unbiased" views on the scruffy soldiers and assorted "reds" who emerged last year from the woodwork of old Portugal to rule "their" paradise.

There were precious few other

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All these arguments were specious. Portugal is an Atlantic, not a Mediterranean, power; its strategic importance and that of its Atlantic islands are linked to the central and south Atlantic and the Cape routes. The "domino" argument was almost entirely ideological, concerned with the potential participation of communists in the governments of Spain, Italy, France, and Greece. The Azores base was called "decisive" only because all the NATO allies and even the client state of Spain had refused the US refueling rights during the Yom Kippur war, not because of the intrinsic merits of the Azores base itself. (The Pentagon's own analyses show that air refueling, although more expensive and cumbersome, would make it possible to by-pass the Azores in resupplying Israel.)

The special sensitivity to the change of government in Lisbon had a hidden cause. A major policy review of US relations with southern Africa had taken place in the summer of 1969. An interdepartmental group on Africa had reported to the National Security Council that "the outlook for the rebellion [in Portuguese Africa] is one of continued stalemate: the rebels cannot oust the Portuguese and the Portuguese can contain but not eliminate the rebels." In 1970 the US began to move closer to both Portugal and South Africa. Export-Import Bank facilities were extended in Portuguese colonies and the covert aid which had previously gone to Holden Roberto's FIMLA in Angola was curtailed, while in Mozambique the strategic within "PRELIMO" which were considered "pro-Western" stopped.

The US Navy made increasing use of Mozambique and Angolan ports, mainly to avoid any "embarrassment" by visits to South Africa itself. Increasing interest was shown in the port of Nacala in Mozambique, which, with the proper technical facilities, could contain the entire US Seventh Fleet. In mid-1972, the "Supreme Allied Command Atlantic (SACLANT) at Norfolk, Virginia, on instructions from the NATO Defense Planning Committee (a committee of the NATO defense ministers), began contingency planning for air and naval operations in defense of South Africa. SACLANT carried out surveys of the state of communications, airfields, and ports of Portugal's Atlantic islands and African colonies.

"The Times, London, October 11, 1974.

"Air Force Magazine, February 1975, "New Look at USAF Strategic Airlift," by Edgar Usinger, pp. 24-31. Also, the remarks by Major General Thomas A. Aldrich, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Military Airlift Command, November 14, 1974. Available from MAC, Office of Information, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois.

"National Security Council Interdepartmental Group on Africa Study Report to National Security Study Memorandum 39, Southern Africa Secret AF/NSC/IG 69-8-August 15, 1969, p. 56. None of the quotations from this document is from Section IV, which presented policy "options." They are all from parts of the study which provided supposedly reliable information on which policy should be based.

"This activity and contingency plan-

the emergence of an apparently powerful communist movement in Portugal were thus greeted in Washington with more than usual embarrassment. Washington adopted a policy of "wait and see." For a time it was the desire of a small baby in a bath for a week and wondering afterward why it drowned. In April and May of 1974 Spínola offered a reforming domestic policy and a conservative colonial policy. Now that one year has passed the US would dearly like to see both carried out; but if it today sought to impose or encourage them by surreptitious aid to so-called "moderates," a civil war would result in Portugal and Angola.

To have welcomed and supported the new regime last year would, in the Secretary's view, have set the precedent for Spain, Italy, and France that he had been prepared to destroy Allende to avoid. It is sad but typical that Kissinger reacted to the democratic revolution in Lisbon as if he had stepped on a Portuguese landmine in Gerald Ford's swimming pool. But then Kissinger had personally visited Caxtelano in Lisbon in January 1974 to thank him for his aid in the October airlift—characteristic of the ineffectuality that also took him to see President Park, and would, if he had had his way, have taken him to visit General Pinochet, to thank him too, no doubt, for defending "democracy."

Little about the internal politics of Portugal can be explained without some historical perspective, and this is no less true of the external relations. The Portuguese revolution and the labyrinth of hidden pressures brought into play when it occurred. The issue is seen, and increasingly so, as a conflict involving the superpowers, and it is certainly true that events in Portugal could alter the balance of forces in Europe and Africa in directions that might damage or further the ambitions of either.

As yet, however, despite appearances and considerable hysteria, this is still no more than a matter of probabilities. Portugal remains a member of NATO, and the frictions that exist have their roots in actions taken in Brussels and Washington, not in Lisbon. IBERLANT, the "Iberian Atlantic" command headquarters of NATO, remains, as it has since 1967, at its offices just off the main road from Lisbon to Cascais, overlooking the narrow entrance to the Tagus. NATO forces continue to maneuver around Portugal's coasts, and periodically anchor off the elegant eighteenth-century Lisbon waterfront to disgorge thousands of sailors for shore leave. At Algarve villa, and in mid-judged pressures might well give substance to NATO's anxieties and make them self-fulfilling as Ambassador Nash Scott told Kissinger many months ago before being dismissed for his pains—nothing of substance has changed.

The economic and security interests of the United States in Portugal have been in effect "indirect." The difficulties of US officials in distinguishing the issues and contending groups, and the violence of their vague fears that something is at stake without much being first reported by Ted Scola, The Washington Post, May 2, 1974.

the ambiguous position. Direct US interests in Portugal are relatively small, about \$150 million, mostly of that recent, and mainly in the form of aid to the Portuguese Navy. The Gulf Oil in the Cabinda enclave, a small territory separated from the rest of Angola to the north of the mouth of the Congo River.

Not nowhere in Portugal or in what was Portuguese Africa, apart from Cabinda, does there exist the clear-cut type of US corporate interests that were threatened and eventually expropriated by the socialist government of Cuba. For example, moreover, the interdepartmental group's report to the National Security Council in 1969 was unequivocal on the "national security" argument. Referring not only to the Portuguese territories but also to the whole of southern Africa, the report stated: "Our policy position on southern African issues affect a range of US interests. None of the interests are vital to our security, but they have political and material importance." (AF NSC/IG 69-8-August 15, 1969, p. 15.)

What was involved were not direct American interests but vast European interests tied into the immense southern African mining complex, a source of vital raw materials and bullion; as well as the important strategic and economic question of the Cape routes, used by the tankers that carry almost all of Europe's oil supplies from the Arabian Gulf. The importance of these factors to Western Europe and therefore to American concerns for the stability of Western Europe had a strong influence on Washington's policies toward Africa. And the same concerns conditioned the US response to the collapse of Portugal's African empire—just as they had affected the increasingly close relations with southern Africa during the past few years.

But the particular problem in the case of Portugal is that NATO began to find the notion of a "pluricontinental Portugal"—the idea that Portugal was an "intercontinental" country with European and African provinces, which was the central ideological (or mystical) tenet of the Salazarist African policy—to be a very convenient fiction just at the time when the whole edifice was about to collapse. NATO's charter excluded it from the South Atlantic, but US and European navy circles, in response to the growing Soviet naval power, had been voicing criticism of this stipulation for a number of years.

Expanding the naval activity of Portugal was of course thoroughly congenial to Admiral Anderson in his Algarve villa, and he was the key private adviser to Kissinger on the subject during the early months, and in all probability still is. In practice, however, this meant that the US was plugged into the most intransigent faction in the Portuguese establishment—admittedly on an improvised and informal basis but nonetheless through an extremely influential channel. These men, the so-called "integracionists," were opposed not simply to the methods of decolonization of the April 1974 revolutionists but to the very idea of decolonization itself. And it was too soon forgotten that this group was also as much opposed to the ideas of General Spínola as to those of

General Vernon Walters, the deputy director of the CIA, speaks Portuguese fluently as a result of his service as a member of the Portuguese Army in Europe during World War II, a period when he became a close personal friend of future marshal Castelo Branco, with whom he would later help to concoct the coup against President Courel. He arrived in Portugal on a "private visit to a friend" during the early summer last year. Not surprisingly that "old friend" was Admiral Anderson. According to usually reliable sources, Walters met with several of the admiral's friends—Francisco Nogueira, Salazar's former foreign minister and the executive head of the Espitolo Santo interests; Admiral Sarmiento Rodrigues, the president of Torralta; Adriano Moreira, chairman of

11's Portuguese subsidiary, Standard Electric; and General Kaliza de An-riaga, once known as "the Portuguese McNamara."

Kaliza, a board member of Petrofina, a subsidiary of the Valium Petrofina and Espitolo Santo interests, had been brought to the US in 1969 to meet with that famous strategist General William Westmoreland. Shortly afterward, as commander in chief in Mozambique, Kaliza set in motion an operation "Gordian knot," billed as "the final blow against PRELIMO," as well as a strategic hamlet program. Both operations, like their progenitors, bought poor military results at great human cost.

The group that Walters met through Anderson was of course none other than the old coterie that had surrounded the doddering Admiral

Américo Tomás, the deposed president of Portugal, whose incessant intrigues had destroyed Caxtelano's faint-hearted attempts at "liberalization" in the early Seventies. And the group contained several bitter personal enemies of General Spínola, enemies who half a year before, when planning the overthrow of the "dangerous liberal" Caxtelano, had also intended to get rid of General Spínola himself and his close friend and colleague General Costa Gomes.

Indeed General Kaliza had informed his friends in US, Spanish, and Brazilian intelligence the previous December of his intentions—at least as far as the overthrow of Caxtelano was concerned. And he had through intermediaries contacted the leaders of the embryonic MFA to seek their support. Oddly, in trying to get their backing, he gave them heretofore secret information on his role in thwarting a

group that Walters met through Anderson was of course none other than the old coterie that had surrounded the doddering Admiral

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The National Book Award for Translation was presented in 1974 to Jackson Matthews for *Minority Tests* by Paul Valéry and in 1976 to Anthony Kerrigan for *The Agency of Christianity and Essays on Faith* by Miguel de Unamuno.

One of Spínola's protégés, then Major (now General) Carlos Fabiao, hearing of the plan to assassinate Spínola and Costa Gomes, publicly denounced the plot at the Institute for Advanced Military Studies in Lisbon. This episode considerably enhanced the prestige of General Costa Gomes, who is regarded as a hero in Portugal. But it was not the only reason for his fall. It also demonstrated how far Kaliaev and his friends were from realizing the political tenor of the MFA: and it helps to explain why both the Spanish and Brazilian governments at first welcomed the coup. As a high official in the State Department observed many months later: "We knew something

Because the character of the regime and the elite was always seen as intimately linked to their vassalage to external powers, it was natural, when-

The basis for convergence between the PAIGC, MPLA, and FRELIMO on the one hand, and the MFA on the other, thus existed from the beginning. A unique alliance between the colonialist officer corps and its opponents was made possible both by the timing and special circumstances of the liberation movements' struggle and by the

This juxtaposition of large Portuguese monopolies, which dominated key parts of the internal market, with extensive but parallel foreign economic interests acting through local foreign-owned companies, worked reasonably harmoniously during the Salazar years. It tended to be based on a highly traditional exchange of Portuguese raw materials and natural products—cork, wine, citrus fruits, fish—for foreign manufactured goods. It was a pattern that conformed with Salazar's opposition to all but perfunctory industrialization, which he

Salazar's long-time Foreign Minister Franco Nogueira and the Espírito Santo interests saw any compromise with liberal demands as suicide—especially demands for compromise in Africa. Nogueira in fact on one occasion observed that if Portugal lost Africa it would "immediately be absorbed by Spain." It is an interesting thought because if Spain absorbed Portugal today it would be much like swallowing a live and activated grenade. But, as Nogueira well knew, if Portugal had been in danger of being

Since 1970 Geoffrey Rippon had been the major political spokesman for the idea, as he put it, that "NATO should broaden its maritime horizons and not have the artificial boundary of the Tropic of Cancer as its southern limit of responsibility in the Atlantic." It was under this conservative pressure, exerted during the early Seventies in the NATO assembly subcommittee on the "Soviet Maritime Threat," that the

policy disagreements with the MFA. For both Spínola and the MFA, their own ways had their own national interests at heart—and these were often different from the interests and preoccupations of foreigners, most especially the British. (It was no accident that Mr. Rippon and some other British leaders turned up at a meeting of the right-wing CDS party last January.) After April 1974 Spínola often fo-

For the Portuguese the war in Guinea-Bissau was a patent absurdity but for reasons of precedent and prestige it could not be abandoned. The conflict tied down a vast army in proportion to the population, yet toward the end Portuguese troops were restricted to enclaves, coexisting in some small towns with the rebels.

was going to happen. What surprised us was the decision to keep the "congress" critical to understanding the fall of General Spínola and the success of the MFA intact, considering the odds. For they are the historical roots of the splits among the reformal power groups that underdetermined the old regime and remained intact when the corporate state itself collapsed. The MFA was the only group, between such *ultras* as General Kúlza, and Spínola, in 1974, and in 1975 has been rooted in these connections. The conservative forces that have lined up against one another in the years before the coup. It is a complex story that goes deep into the history of the state and its ramifications and is by no means over. The analysis may yet explode, and in the case where the struggle over the last regime is by no means over—regala.

An intimate part of these shared understandings between the MFA and the African movements was a deep hostility to liberalism, both political and economic. For the condominium that the Powers have never been able to resolve is this: whenever economic and political liberalism are wedded, orthodoxy in one makes the other hollow. The arrival of individual liberties during the nineteenth century threatened also to remove the few traditional protections the poorer classes had against economic exploitation. The MFA was aware of this, and that it feared the strong expanding industrial powers of northwestern Europe, threatened a country like Portugal with total subjection. Hence the old oligarchies could always rely on the support of nationalism, despite the fact that this was a deep subjection to foreign interests that had often caused their overthrow, in the first place.

without, in Premier Casteano's words, "killing the goose that laid the golden eggs." It is worth remembering that the ambivalence of the government toward the monopolies was so great before the coup as it is now; some of the most hostile passages in Casteano's *Deposited* were directed at Antônio Champalimaud.

Champalimaud was himself one of the most "nationalist" of Portuguese businessmen and his industrial empire one of the least involved in foreign entanglements. He was also the editor of the *Revista de Generalidade*, the "nationalist" magazine of the great Portuguese industrial magnates were in part a ploy, for nationalism served their own interests as much as those of the nation; but there was an important element of truth to them as well. The "revolutionary" government no less than its "fascist" predecessor is how to achieve a new definition of social

main outlet from the Katanga and Zambian copper belt to Lobito Bay in Angola, known by the British-based southern African giant Tanyangika Concessions.

The Anglo-Portuguese connection was of course the oldest and most persistent of Portugal's foreign economic and political relationships. Arthur William Costigan, some time in the 1930s, observed (in 1787) that the "wretched" had the lowest conditions of life, you shall not meet with anyone whose hours of the ~~week~~ ^{day} ~~best~~ ^{best} exceed ~~any~~ ^{any} ~~but~~ ^{but} dogs and Englishmen." Until only recently a large and ostentatious Union Jack used to fly each Sunday over the Victorian building that joins the elegant nineteenth-century streets of downtown Lisbon with the highly twisting alleyways of the Bairro Alto. Henry Fielding is buried in the English cemetery. William Beckford once cavorted with Lisbon choribos, his lengthy and

More than anything else this comment by Caetano drove Spínola into opposition. But the circumstances surrounding his ouster in Guinea had themselves already exercised a profound influence on him, on him and on the army he commanded. Soon after his arrival in the late 1960s, Spínola abandoned the largely American-inspired strategy of his predecessor Arnaldo Schultz and borrowed from the techniques of the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Special Forces teams, starting a series of campaigns, attempted to encourage local participation in colonial making. He called Jorge de Melo, whose CUF he virtually ran Portuguese Guinea as a private business field, into demobilization, some small social responsibility distribution and giving him financial aid for settling peasant farmers. Spínola's tenure in Guinea-Bissau

relatively easy for Portuguese "imperialists" of yesterday to become the "anti-imperialists" of today. In Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola the liberation movements have always made a careful distinction between the "Portuguese people" on whom they counted for support and the dictatorial government

preneurship of liberal capitalism. As the new policy was clearly liberal capitalism for some but not for others—becoming more “liberal” the smaller you were and less “liberal” the bigger—it was not greeted with much enthusiasm, especially by the victims who were driven out of business by

⁸ This activity is discussed in detail by Sean Gervasi in "NATO: Towards defense co-operation with the white regimes," *Portugal, The NATO Powers and Southern Africa, A Report to the Special Committee on Decolonization of the United Nations*, Confidential.

acters in the struggles within the Portuguese army during the past year worked with Spínola when he was governor in Guinea, and they either worshiped him or distrusted him because of it. Almeida Bruno, a Spínola appointee to the council of state after the coup, was one of his leading field

gle with the MFA following the resignation of Professor Palma Carlos in July 1974, had headed special operations in Guinea. Carlos Fabião, the last Portuguese governor of Guinea, now commander in chief of the Portuguese army, was Spínola's other leading field commander.

General Fabião is archetypal of the subtle impact of Guinea in the formation of the new Portuguese army, an impact whose activity and attitudes are still underestimated by civilian politicians and foreign diplomats alike. Both continue to swap stories of the young officers' "naïveté," their secret financial deals, their personal abuse of power and courting and womanizing, as if by portraying them as part of the old gang they can reassure themselves of their intentions. So far they have always been wrong and have consistently underestimated the will and dedication of the MFA. And about no one have they been more wrong than about Carlos Fabião. A tough, quiet, hardheaded officer, Fabião spent much of the past thirteen years in Guinea, where he was a protégé of Spínola. But his loyalty to his experience in Guinea proved greater than his personal loyalty to the monolithic general.

Fabião directed the major activities of the Portuguese army in Guinea in social and economic reconstruction. Working in the villages, he saw that such a program required a fundamental transformation of the military ethic. Perhaps this was a natural conclusion for an intelligent man fighting an unpopular war with a conscript army

on "rationalizations" so strained that they verged on absurdity. But a transformation of social views did take place among the officers and its depth was not appreciated in Lisbon. In the case of Fabião, this led to a critical miscalculation about his probable action (or inaction) by both Spínolistas and several Western intelligence agencies during the debate of March 1975, which led Spínola to leave the country.

Had Fabião's stated convictions been treated seriously, then his failure to move in support of the abortive Spínolista push on March 11 would have come as no surprise. Western agents who apparently expected him to act differently, he had outlined his philosophy in some detail in the socialist daily *República* last October. Speaking of the new internal relationships in the army, he observed that leadership did not rest on any imposed or preordained authority but was exercised by the mutual perception of objectives and the means to achieve them. Speaking of Guinea, he said: "Man alone, self-sufficient, omnipotent, has become a relic of the past, a type of extinct dinosaur, because productive work today is only possible by teamwork with the aid and confidence of all. It is a lesson I will never forget" (*República*, October 30, 1974).

To outsiders such comments seem like platitudes. For a country where such concepts never existed, and within a military establishment which had barely emerged from the nineteenth century, they were revolutionary. And they have been since the war. None of the activities of the Portuguese army since the ouster of

understanding of the depth of conviction behind the changes that have been set in motion by men like General Fabião.

Much of what they have done shows how serious and far-reaching their intentions are: the "cultural dynamization" teams which have spread throughout the country, and whose activity was critical in informing the people of their duty to vote and how to go about it; the central role the army has defined for itself in the social and economic reconstruction of Portugal; the myriad committees of soldiers, sergeants and commissioned officers, that are functioning in quasi-legislative bodies within the army. Some Portuguese have been treated harshly and crudely under the rule of the MFA leaders, as the accompanying statement by António de Figueiredo, a widely respected Portuguese liberal, shows. (See box.) But the soldiers who brought about a free election by secret ballot for 92 percent of the eligible voters are not imposing a police state from it.

In almost all these activities Guinea-Bissau was the progenitor. The teams of soldiers General Fabião sent into



the African villages to encourage expression of local opinion and the formation of cooperatives prefigured the MFA groups that ranged over Portugal before the recent elections. And long before the MFA in Portugal admitted private soldiers and sergeants to its membership and assemblies, or provided for the participation of conscript militia in its deliberations, the MFA officers in its deliberations had institutionalized all of these reforms. Indeed, they had done so as early as June of 1974, and this fact was of central importance to the pace of decolonization in Africa.

The war in West Africa had produced one of the few theoreticians of modern Africa. Amílcar Cabral, a man European dogmatists found heretical and comical until his ideas succeeded so well that in a desperate bid to split movement and vitiate his cause, they had done so as early as June of 1974, and this fact was of central importance to the pace of decolonization in Africa.

These connections proved vital during the past year. What is insufficiently appreciated is that during the last twelve months a quiet triumph for African and nonaligned diplomacy has taken place, one no less remarkable for having passed almost unnoticed. While Kissinger muttered about the PCP (whose absence from these develop-

ment that reason alone) and Admiral Anderson's friends plotted, a strenuous secret diplomacy had the basis for settlements in the Portuguese colonies. These settlements remain fragile, especially in Angola, which has long been divided by intricate disputes among the liberation movements; but as late as December 1974 few would have predicted that any settlements whatsoever could be made.

The diplomacy that arranged them emanated largely from Algiers and from Luanda in Zambia, one in North Africa and the other in the delicate boundary between black Africa and the white minority regimes of the south. And the process of making the settlements helped also to bring Spínola down.

The underlying reasons for this African success should be clear. Washington and Western Europe could not distinguish the forces at play in the Portuguese situation, and bungled into associations with groups such as the one around General Kaúlza de Arriaga,

doomed to help to destroy the very solution that the US must now dearly uphold. For the US must now dearly uphold the solution that the US must now dearly uphold. For the US must now dearly uphold the solution that the US must now dearly uphold.

During the past year three crises moved Portugal decisively to the left and Portuguese Africa equally decisively toward independence. They appeared as a series of sometimes lengthy struggles in which political tensions in Portugal, developments in Africa, and external pressures, both overt and covert, combined to force major confrontations. During these crises most

ship into democracy. But since the young know of both only through what they read in books, I wonder whether their experience qualifies them to arrest people. I, for one, can tell them that they are inflicting on others many of the abuses the previous regime inflicted on me and on many men of my generation. It was so bad that I lost the taste for revenge.

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causes of what was happening. But almost never did these surface in the solution by Spínola. Only when the crises were over and the consequences were patent—the resignation of Premier Palma Carlos on July 9, 1974, the resignation of General Spínola from the presidency on September 30, 1974, the oustering of the *intenciona* of March 11, 1975—were they publicly discussed by outsiders. But no one involved ever doubted that the shape and content of the political future in Portugal and the achievement of independence in the African colonies were intimately linked. The outcome of the struggle in one sphere would help to consolidate victory or bring defeat in the other. And the victory of the MFA is still not complete.

In Lisbon, the political process was something like peeling a large artichoke, a gradual stripping away of layers, a simplification of political structures. In May 1974 these were astoundingly complex; overlapping and badly defined responsibilities were shared among the president, the council of state, the junta of national salvation, the provisional government, the old military hierarchies, and the MFA coordinating committee—all reflecting real confusion in the division of power. Today all these entities have been replaced or subsumed by a simple military revolutionary council, plans for which first emerged within the MFA last September and were put

The fourth provisional government, sworn in during March, still includes representatives of various political parties (PSP, PCP, MDP/CDE, PPD), but it has at its core, in charge of the economic ministries, a strong and highly competent team of radical economists, some of them, such as the Catholic radical Pereira de Faria, well known and respected in the nonradical US academic circles. This is in sharp contrast to the paralyzing hostilities and lack of common ground that existed among the members of the first provisional government under Professor Palma Carlos which fell last July. The old army general officer corps—with some notable exceptions, not least the new president of the republic, General Costa Gomes—has been flushed away (*avacuada*) and the old staff officer corps abolished. The Portuguese army now has established a consultative assembly within its own ranks and has a new hierarchy at its head, some of its members elected from within the MFA. The majors of 1974 have become the generals of 1975.

Each crisis in Lisbon was connected with critical moments in the negotiations in Africa where the liberation movements combined military pressures with diplomatic inducements to allow them a free hand. In Mozambique especially, FRELIMO stepped up its fighting while arranging local ceasefires. The MFA in Africa was already

we, each colony having a different MFA organization linked only informally to the others and, through Captain Vasco Lourenço, to the coordinating committee of the MFA in Lisbon. These arrangements prefigured independence and they allowed a great deal of flexibility in local arrangements of trade and credit encountered by Allende.

In Guinea-Bissau local peace came long before its recognition in a formal settlement. The circumstances of that settlement are extremely revealing. In May 1974, Spínola's friend Colonel Almeida Bruno went to London with Afonso Soares to negotiate with the European orbit and shifted to the secret diplomacy carried out in Algiers by Major Melo Antunes of the MFA. (Melo Antunes replaced Soares as foreign minister in March 1975.) A settlement was finally arranged at the end of July, but only after a new cabinet had been installed with the pro-PCP brigadier general Vasco Gonçalves as premier; and after the MFA had consolidated its military power in Portugal by setting up a security force, COPCON, under the effective command of Otelo de Carvalho, who also became commander of the Lisbon military garrison.

This was a crucial blow to Spínola's power, perhaps the most important one. The MFA and its leftist allies in Lisbon could make an African settlement that he could not, sustaining a momentum toward African independence which he opposed. Similar crises erupted over Mozambique in August and September and over Angola from January to March. Both were complex, but in each case the settlements showed up the power of the MFA and allowed it to drive from power the moderate and conservative forces in Lisbon that wanted to hold on to Portuguese Africa.

In all these events the hands of outsiders were concealed, but gradually they are becoming more discernible. Spínola fell from power as president in September after failing to hold a constitutionally intended to mobilize a "silent majority" in favor of the president in the elections—partly at the hands of the supreme authority. Mixed up in this strategy were all the old figures of the "integrationist" faction, who were in touch with Admiral Anderson and General Walters. Their intrigues only hurt Spínola's own prospects and they antagonized his program for gradual change in Africa and liberal social reform at home. A number of them, including Kaúlza de Arriaga, Sarmento Rodrigues, Arnaldo Schultz, Franco Nogueira, and several members of the Espírito Santo family, were later taken off to jail by COPCON, where some remain (held under military jurisdiction that denies them anything resembling due process). In January, as the Angola issue became more acute, it was the turn of Geoffrey Rippon and his friends, the US and Western European supporters of the right-wing CDS, to provide dubious advice and assistance for a lost cause.

Foreign leverage in Portugal will continue to be a central issue in the months ahead. It will be a difficult and dangerous time. Having nationalized the banks and large enterprises, the government must now manage the

being elephantine and antiscientific. This will complicate relations with the former colonies, with which the MFA hopes to preserve some of the old economic ties. Over 70 percent of Portugal's commerce is with Western Europe and the US, and it is now subject to the kinds of manipulations of trade and credit encountered by Allende.

Meanwhile Portugal faces immense social and economic problems. More than a million workers are in France or Germany, their remittances now pared down. At home, 300,000 of the total industrial work force of one million are unemployed while thousands of embittered ex-colonists are returning from Africa and 200,000 young army conscripts face demobilization. Already unemployed workers and poor villagers have been taking over the new houses in which many Portuguese workers abroad have invested their savings—a potential source of civil strife.

Premier Vasco Gonçalves has talked incessantly of a policy of "austerity," but the effect of this on the government's popular support could be severe. So far those who have gained from the civil servants, the military, and the factory workers in the larger industries, all who have had substantial raises in pay, with inflation and increasing austerity, they are bound to see these gains wither. Food prices in some areas have increased by as much as 50 percent during the past year.

The PCP, which has been the main force in favor of resuming wage demands, will be crucial in the coming conflict over austerity. It remains firmly entrenched in the provisional government, the unions, and, through "workers' commissions," it has a strong influence on the press and television. The recent failure of the PCP in the elections—partly attributable to its tight and unpopular policies on wages—will not destroy these positions of strength. For the elections were not about the immediate distribution of power itself. That had been predetermined by the pact between the MFA and the political parties who accepted the dominance of the MFA in political life for the next three to five years. Cunha's early alliance with the MFA allowed him successfully to press for this, fearing precisely the election outcome that occurred.

But the elections have already had an enormous effect on the ambience of power in Portugal. The triumph of Soares and the strength of the PPD, the party on which Spínola had based his original political strategy, show how strong a threat Spínola was—and still remains—even out of office and out of Portugal (although both the Socialists and the PPD would publicly deny this). In January, as the PCP lost support, there was a real possibility of cooperation between Soares and the Spínolistas—a possibility that made the MFA and the PCP all the more anxious to consolidate their alliance. For Spínola still retains a wide popular following in Portugal.

The real test of the MFA regime has just begun. And the futures of Portugal and Angola remain linked. For some, even the cost of civil war might not be too great to turn the clock back. It has happened before. (This is the second of two articles on Portugal.)

IN PORTUGUESE PRISONS

Antonio de Figueiredo

—Lisbon

I have heard many complaints of abuses in cases of arrests, in the ordinary treatment of prisoners, and of conditions in the overcrowded prisons. Such complaints prompt the recollection that it was, after all, the older generation that suffered the abuses of the police under the former regime and that the young really do not know the meaning of prison.

Take one proven fact. There are several men, who happen to be rich bankers, who have been arrested by unauthorized groups of marines and soldiers in uniform or kept in jail in spite of orders for their release. In many cases they have been arrested, the record being now the case of a bank tycoon, the Count of Caria, who has been arrested and rearrested five times.

Well, I remember my own shattering experience of undetermined and arbitrary imprisonment and torture and isolation under the former regime. Such a man is no longer just a rich man. He is likely to be a poor individual, deprived of the right to sleep even when he goes home to his family without knowing when he will next return to prison.

And then it is also the young, and often the very young, who point the finger and mock at the children of the former state police officers and make their life a misery. All in all, the revolutions might be justified and necessary in social history, but when they are happening they can be ugly and brutal. And not all violence is marked by blood.

I have complained about this to many veteran freedom fighters whom I know well and who now hold the positions of power. I have also told them that as disturbing as the events is the fact that bring in Portugal no one dares or can bring them openly into the media.

I have the impression that all this is happening because the old in Portugal have their attention turned into the multiple and urgent tasks of

ship into democracy. But since the young know of both only through what they read in books, I wonder whether their experience qualifies them to arrest people. I, for one, can tell them that they are inflicting on others many of the abuses the previous regime inflicted on me and on many men of my generation. It was so bad that I lost the taste for revenge.

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